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ABSTRACT

Although the
with

ma~~ied

~elative

geog~aphic

women--as the

maximization--is a

~esult

immobility associated

of family utility

notion, its effect on the male-

familia~

female wage gap has not been examined

empi~ically,

because of the unavailability of adequate data.
the 1980 Census, which
locations of all
p~esent

the

fo~

~espondents

fi~st

in

Utilizing

time identifies the

met~opolitan

study estimates the impact of

pe~haps

the

a~eas,

immobility

sex-~elated

on the male-female wage gap.
To the extent that wives have less
than

thei~

husbands,

ma~~ied

women may be

thei~

employment mainly in the local

thei~

husbands who

a~e

mo~e

employment in the national
case, then

ma~~ied

The

labo~

empi~ical

labo~

human capital

fo~ced

ma~ket.

women·s wages will
o~

to optimize
unlike

ma~ket,

likely to optimize
labo~

sensitive than those of men
the local

ma~ket

thei~

If this is the

p~esumably

be

mo~e

single women to the size of

ma~ket.

findings

f~om

a

1/1000 sample

f~om

the 1980

Census indicate that the positive impact of city size on
ea~nings

men;

in

is in fact
othe~

wo~ds,

la~ge~

fo~

ma~~ied

women than

the wage gap between
iii

ma~~ied

fo~

ma~~ied

men and

women narrows as city size increases.

Computations based on

the regression results show that about 12 percent of the
unexplained wage gap between married men and women may be
accounted for by city size.

However, the wage gap between

single men and women does not seem to have a statistically
significant relationship with city size.
These results are consistent with the main implications of
Mincer·s hypothesis of a locational tie associated with
married women.

But the results do not identify which of the

following two mechanisms is primarily responsible for
depressing the wages of tied individuals in small labor
markets: overqualification (because of too little diversity
and specialization in available jobs) or monopsony <too few
employers to guarantee wage competition).

Since tests for

the overqualification hypothesis were inconclusive, the
present study primarily examines the monopsony hypothesis,
both theoretically and empirically.
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GHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Gender and marital status are important determinants of

~eographic

mobility.

To the extent that wives have less

human capital investment and labor force attachment than
their husbands, the family utility maximization process may
place a locational constraint on married

-------

women~

To put it in

Mincer's terms, wives are more likely to be tied stayers or
tied movers.

To what extent is the relative immobility of

married women responsible for the widely observed male-female
wage gap?

Until recently this has been a difficult question

to answer empirically, since detailed identification of
individuals by geographic location in national micro-data
samples has not been available.

With the 1980 Census now

identifying locations of all respondents residing in
metropolitan areas, the impact of sex-related immobility on
the male-female wage gap can be estimated, and the
implications derived from the locational tie hypothesis can
be more easily tested.
The present study is essentially an attempt to explain the
difference in the degree of geographic mobility between
married men and women, and to examine its effects on the wage

1

gap between these two groups.

The analysis is based on the

premise that immobility affects married women more in small
labor markets than in large ones.
~

he earnings of women in a small labor market
small city> may be affected by two factors:

(i.e., a

(a) the narrow

range of occupational categories and the limited
specialization within each occupation, which forces women to
take odd jobs in which their qualifications cannot be fully
utilized; and

(b) the fact that, even if they find employment

in their optimal

job, the number of potential employers in

that occupation may be too small to guarantee competitive

---

wages....

In case <a>, women ' s wages may be suppressed by

overqualification; in case <b>, their wages may be suppressed
by the inelastic labor supply curve to the employer leading
to monopsonistic wages.

-

mutually exclusive.

These two possibilities are not

Women in a small city may suffer the

consequences of either overqualification or monopsony, or
both.

Note, however, that the earnings of women in a large

city are less likely to be affected by either condition.
In sum, if married women

(given their locational

costraint> can optimize their earnings primarily in the local
labor market, then the very size of the local market becomes
a determinant of the wage gap between married men and women.
For the wages of married women will be more sensitive to the
size of the local market than the wages of married men.
In fact, the results of the 1980 Census 1/1000 sample
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worked out in this study indicate that the impact of city
size on earnings is larger for women than for men.

The wages

of married males increase by 1.3 percent for each increment
of a million in city size, while the wages of married females
increase by 2.2 percent for the same increment in city size.
When the census data are grouped into subsamples by
occupation, the results show instructive differences.

For

instance, the results for segregated occupations reveal that
there is a great difference between male segregated and
female segregated occupations in the effect of city size on
wages.

While nurses <representing female segregated

occupations) gain 3.7 percent in wages for each increment of
one million in city size, engineers <probably the most
comparable male segregated occupation> gain only 1.1 percent
in wages for each increment of one million in city size.

The

findings for mixed occupations reveal that there is often an
even greater difference between men and women in the
sensitivity of wages to city size.

The data for

postsecondary teachers indicate that the wages of male
professors do not have a statistically significant
relationship with city size, but that the wages of female
professors increase by 4.3 percent for each increment of a
million in city size.
rule.

There are of course exceptions to this

The main exception I could find is public school

teachers.

While male teachers gain 4 percent in wages per

increase of one million in city size, female teachers gain

3

only 1.4 percent in wages for the same increment in city
size.
Since about one quarter of the U.S. population lives in
cities with a population of under one million and another
quarter in rural areas and towns with a population of under
100,000, the aggregate effects of the locational tie on the
earnings of married women is expected to be substantial.

In

fact, the calculations show that about 12 percent of the
'

otherwise unexplained wage gap between married men and women
can be explained by city size.

----------The

findings are consistent with the locational tie theory

of Mincer.

But such findings are also consistent with two

partly conflicting implications of that theory: the
overqualification and monopsony hypotheses.

If

overqualification (as an indication of wasted human capital>
is a major manifestation of the locational tie for married
women, then one would expect that the rate of return to
education for married women would increase with city size.
However, the findings indicate that the rate of return to
education for married women does not have a statistically
significant relationship with city size.

One cannot reject a

hypothesis on the basis of statistically insignificant
results.

Such results, however, suggest that a thorough

investigation of alternative arguments is in order.

As one

alternative, the present study pays special attention to the
monopsony hypothesis, particularly in the context of sex4

related geographic immobility.
Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the relevant
literature, constructs a theoretical framework from these
existing studies, and derives testable implications.

Chapter

3 derives monopsony models applicable to gender-specific
differences in geographic mobility.

Chapter 4 gives a

detailed description of the 1980 Census data.
and 7 discuss the empirical findings.

Chapters 5, 6,

The final chapter

presents a summary of the empirical findings and conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND

The principle that division of labor allows
specialization which in turn increases wealth

noted as

early as the time of Adam Smith -- applies to families no
less than nations.

The division of labor between husband and

wife, which has been observed in all cultures throughout the
history of mankind,

is understood by economists to be the

outcome of a rational process of family utility maximization.
The increasing returns from specialization create a division
of labor in the allocation of time and human capital
investments between the husband and wife.
absence of differences in natural

1

Even in the

abilities and acquired

training, the different roles men and women play in the
process of child rearing would most likely result in the
traditional sexual division of labor -- the wife's
~

r_.'\ _.,.· •v
,n_

t-' 1

specialization in the household sector and the husband ' s

.

1.

spec1a 1.zation in the market sector.
l .......

. \rJ..~ -:\
~

~

~

~

The simple fact that a married working woman has to divide
~ r
her time between market work and household work has profound
implications for her economic status.

Human capital studies

often link the household responsibilities of married women

6

with their disadvantages in the labor market
Mincer and Polachek [1976,

19781, Mincer and Ofek [19821,

Sandell and Shapiro [19781, Becker [1985]).

~l

(for example,

The bottom line

of these studies is that, because of their traditional role,

~

'

women in general
and quality.

--------

invest less in job training in both quantity

A brief review of the human capital approach to

the male-female wage gap is provided in the following

section.

2.1

Less Investment in On-the-job Training:
Premarket Effects
Mincer and Polachek [1974] noted that women, as the

primary providers of household work, spend a shorter time in
the labor force over their life cycle.

Moreover, their labor

force participation is often discontinuous.

On the average,

mainly due to their child rearing responsibilities, women
spend more than ten years of their lives out of the labor
force.

The labor force intermittency of women has a two-fold

effect on their earnings.

It may depreciate their existing

human capital stock outright

(ex post effect>; and it may

deter them from investing in their human capital in
anticipation of having to leave the work force in the future
<ex ante effect>.

2

The discontinuous labor force

participation of women not only lowers their earnings
directly, but also indirectly -- by leading women into low7

skill occupations with low "atrophy" rates <Polachek [1979]).
In a recent wor k , Becker [1985] adds another dimension to
the on-the-job investment analysis by explicitly formulating
the quality aspect of the investment.

He proposes that even

if a married woman participates in the labor force as long a s
a man, her job investment may still be lower.
If child care and other housework demand relatively large
quantities of "energy" compared to leisure and other
nonmarket uses of time by men, women with responsibilities
for housework would have less energy available for the
market than men would.
(pp. 5 3 5)
Married women

<particularly those with young children), to

the extent that they are primarily responsible for housework,
may have less energy available to allocate to market
activities.

Holding other factors constant, therefore, their

on-the-job investment may be suppressed in terms of intensity
as well.

And th i s relatively lower energy available for

market wor k may force women to economize by seeking jobs and
occupations that require less e x penditure of energy per hour,
further suppressing the level of their on-the-job investment.

2.2

Locational Constraints: More Premarket Effects

We have just seen how the trad i tional role of a woman in
the family may decrease her market productivity by lowering
both the quantity and quality of her job investments.
[1978] takes this a step further.

8

Mincer

He proposes that that the

~low

market product;v;ty of marr;ed women may cause them to

invest less in yet another form of human capital -As a result, wives are more likely to be
geographically "tied", locating where their husbands '
rather than their own.

Mincer

establishes an economic definition of family migration ties
and predicts, among other things, how they affect the
earnings of family members.
Of course, the lower level of labor force participation,
the lower expenditure of effort, and the locational tie are
not separate problems.

They are interrelated in many ways,

reinforcing one another and producing a compound effect on
women ' s market earnings.

The detailed review of Mincer ' s

work in the next section is provided as a point of departure
for the present study.

2.2.1

Family Migration Decision

Mincer investigates the problem of labor migration in the
context of family utility maximization.

For simplicity, he

implicitly assumes that utility is monotonically related to
real income.

Thus migration to a particular destination

takes place when the net gain in family income from moving
<return minus cost of moving) is positive.
Wife families,

For husband - and -

to give the most simple illustration, there

9

are two streams of personal returns,
c~,

R~,

and personal costs,

from migration:

c ....
migration is,

G~

=

Thus, net family gain from

Gn + G... , where G is net gain from

migration and the subscripts f,

h, and w denote family,

husband, and wife respectively.
The decision to migrate will be made only when
positive.

G~

is

If Gn and G... have the same sign or if one of them

is zero, then there are no negative externalities imposed by
the migration tie on either spouse.

Thus the decision

whether or not to migrate will be unaffected by marital
But if Gn and G... are non-zero and differ in sign,

status.

then there are two kinds of negative externalities that must
be imposed on one of the spouses.
(1)

If

G~

> 0, then one spouse will accompany the other

despite his or her personal
person a
(2)

If

G~

loss -

Mincer terms this

"tied mover".

< 0, then one spouse will be forced to remain in

the original

family location even though he or she can

obtain a personal gain from moving -

Mincer terms this

person a "tied stayer".
By definition, whether a move takes place or not, the
personal

loss incurred by the tied person must be smaller

than the personal gain of his or her spouse.
To get a rough idea of the prevalence of migration ties,
suppose that 25 percent of unattached adults migrate over a

10

period of three

years.~

If the signs of Gh and G_ are

independent in probability, 6.25 percent of all families will
migrate without producing tied movers; 56.25 percent of all
families will stay without producing tied stayers; 37.5
percent of all families will
tied mover.

have either a tied stayer or a

The actual distribution of tied spouses among

these movers and stayers is not the main focus of this study,
for either form of tie creates negative externalities for the
affected persons.
Our immediate task is to analyze why migration ties, on
the average, affect women more than men.

Let us define the

net monetary gain from moving for family when Gh

>

0

and G_

0 as:

<2. 1 )

Similarly, the net monetary gain from moving for family when

8n < 0 and G_ > 0 is:

<2.2)

where r

=

the rate of return to human capital

a = the rate of appreciation in earnings at the
destination
d = the rate of depreciation in earnings at the
destination

11

<

N

=

the expected number of remaining years in the labor
force until retirement

K

=

human capital stock prior to migration

c

=

the direct costs of moving,

including psychic

costs.

The relevant for the discussion are the cases in which a
and d

> 0.

0

Assuming a zero discount rate for simplicity, the

first terms on the right-hand-side of equations
(2.2)

>

(2.1>

and

are the personal returns from migration in terms of the

augmented earnings streams until

retirement.

The second

terms in both equations represent the indirect costs of
moving in terms of the foregone earnings of the spouse at the
destination.

The direct costs of moving can be regarded as

the same for the family no matter who initiates the
migration.
If the term

G~h

is smaller than zero, then the husband is

the tied stayer;

if i t is greater than zero, then the wife is

the tied mover.

Similarly, a negative sign of G~- implies

that the wife will be the tied stayer;

a positive sign

implies that the husband will be the tied mover.

For the

husband to be the tied mover, the wife's personal gains from
migration should be large enough to compensate for his loss
in earnings and the direct cost of moving.
It is obvious that the probability of a spouse being tied
depends on the relative magnitude of his or her N~K~.
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If

NhKh

>

N_K_, then there is a higher probability of the

occurrence of a tied wife than of a tied husband.

In

general, the wife ' s market oriented experience level

<K>

is

Moreover, the wife expects a

less than her husband ' s.

shorter period of labor force participation

<N>

than her

husband mainly due to her responsibilities in the home and
child rearing.

4

This leads to the generalization that the

probability of married women being either tied movers or tied
stayers is greater than that of married men.
formal

To put it in

terms, suppose a and d are random variables

distributed with E<a>

<2.3>

E<d>

E<G..-h>= r _/) (l<hNh -

=jJ >

0.

1<-N-> -

c

Then

>

rj<KwN_ -

KhNh)

-

= E<G..-->

It follows that:

(2.4)

Prob<G..-h

>

0)

>

Prob<G .. _

> O>

That is, the wife is more likely to become a tied mover than
the husband.

<2.5)

Similarly,

Prob<G .. h

< 0) < Prob(G_._ < O>

Which indicates that the wife is also more likely than her
husband to become a tied stayer.

13

c

The concept of migration ties can be generalized by
considering all possible destinations.a

The main implication

remains the same.
Thus far we have established how family income
maximization results in geographic constraints on the
mobility of married women.

In fact,

several studies provide

evidence that family migration increases the earnings of
husbands but reduces the earnings of wives [Polachek and
Horvath

2.3

<1977), Sandell

<1977), Gallaway

<1969)].

Locational Tie and City Size

To carry the argument of the "tied wife" to its extreme,
husbands would tend to locate themselves in the geographic
market of their highest possible earnings <appropriately
adjusted for non-monetary factors).

Their job searches span

all areas in the entire market system.

Wives, however, would

tend to optimize their employment opportunities mainly in the
local markets where their husbands' chosen jobs are located.
For wives, therefore, the characteristics of local
markets become a major determinant of earnings.

labor

In

particular, the number and availability of competing
potential employers in the local

market may place an

important constraint on the earnings of married women.

The

Penalty that the family migration tie imposes in terms of

14

wives ·

ea~nings

will be

Women in

cities.

from the tie,

fo~

g~eate~

la~ge

a

u~ban

dive~se

exists within the local

a~eas

labo~

la~ge

labo~

ma~ket

occupations and high
occupational

suffe~

thei~

a

employe~s

o~

move~s

of occupational

loss

lesse~

oppo~tunities
highe~

la~ge

~ange

of

of job specialization within each

within

thei~

in two ways:

catego~ies

smalle~

optimal occupation

<a>

city have

la~ge

occupations.

But women in a small city may be penalized
staye~s

a

They have a

In addition, women in

catego~y.

many potential

will

ma~ket.

offe~s

deg~ee

wives living in

of employment

~ange

of being employed in

p~obability

since a

fo~

fa~

being tied

because of the small

~ange

and the limited job specialzation

within each occupation, they may have to choose an odd
occupation in which
utilized;

<b>

thei~

full

qualifications cannot be

even if they find employment in

occupation, the

numbe~

of potential

occupation may be too small to

employe~s

gua~antee

thei~

optimal

in the

competitive wages.

In case (a), women ' s wages may be supp~essed by
overqualification;

in case (b),

thei~

wages may be

supp~essed

by the inelastic labo~ supply cu~ve to the employe~ that
result in monopsonistic conditions.
Since the size of the local

labo~

ma~ket

dete~mines

the

degree of wage loss associated with the locational tie, we
can predict the following decision ma k ing behavio~.

When

both spouses have high levels of human capital and labo~
force attachment, the couple may e x pect the potential

15

income

loss from the locational tie in a small city to be too great
and are more likely to locate in a

large metropolitan area.

The larger the difference in earning power between husband
and wife, the less cost is incurred by the tied spouse in
terms of foregone earnings and the more li k ely i t is that the
couple will be willing to move to a small city.

Therefore,

one can expect that the husband-wife wage ratio will de c rea se
as city size increases.

2.4

Market Effects

Up to section 2.2 we have considered only premarket or the
supply-side effects of the division of labor.

Now we have to

bring employers into the picture to see the full effects of
women ' s traditional role on their earnings.

For the reasons

given in section 2.3, this should not ma k e significant
difference for women in large labor market.

However, women

in small labor market may be at a disadvantage even in
selling their human capital at its already depressed level.
We must ask what kind of market conditions confront tied
Women in small city.
Frank [1978J.
local

One possible process is hypothesized by

He addresses the plig h t

labor mar k et.

of tied women in small

As reviewed in the next section, Fran k

Presents overqualification as the main mechanism through
Which the family migration tie suppresses the wages of

16

married women.

2.4.1

Overqualification Theory

In order to make the analysis consistent with the human
capital framework,

I made some modification to Frank's

exposition of overqualification.

Suppose that each worker

possesses human capial whose production function is given by

where S and E represent schooling and job experience and
subscripts g and s denote general and specific kinds of
investments respectively.

This particular production

function allows human capital investments in both schooling 6
and job experience to have general and specific components.
General human capial is defined to be compensated at a
rate determined in the national market.

But specific human

capital is compensated at a rate determined by individual
employers.

Since the return to specific investment

fluctuates from one employer to another, it can be used to
determine the degree of matching between the employer and
employee.
By definition, one is exactly qualified, if she is
compensated fully for all

her specific human capital; one is

17

overqualified, if she is less than fully compensated for her
The excess qualifications of the

specific human capital.

overqualified person have no value to the employer in terms
Of course, the person's qualifications are

of productivity.

not fairly compensated from the employee ' s point of view
some of her qualifications are wasted.
The level of overqualification is given by

(2.7)

where r-••

z

and r_ are the potential maximum rate of return

and the actual rate of return to specific human capital
respectively.

If Z

for the position;

=

if Z

0, the individual

is exactly qualified

> 0, overqualified.

In order to maximize one s wage, the individual should
identify the job vacancy in which she can minimize her
overqualification level.

Let the minimum level of

overqualification in a local market be:

(2.8)

Where r_• represents the maximum rate of return to specific
human capital obtainable in the local market.
Assuming that each local

labor market has a distribution

Of vacancies with different levels of r_,

the illustration in

Figure 2.1 summarizes the process described above.

18

The

straight hash mark denotes the level of r**.

FIGURE 2.1
OVERQUALIFICATION LEVELS IN A LOCAL LABOR MARKET

z-

r.•

r**

o _1 _______ ______ __ _ 2 _ _ _ _ _
'

I

I

If

z•,

I

the m1n1mum overqualification level

local market,
markets.

z-

I

~

is non-zero, the individual

Ma x imizing one ' s

in a g1ven

may consider other

earnings globally implies that on e

should move to a market that contains the employer offering
her r.••.

For a single individual, moving to a mar k et that

offers zero overqualification is a relatively simple matter.
But for married individuals complications may arise s1nce
each spouse may find his or her zero overqualification level
in a different market.
combined level of

A couple may try to locate where the

Z of both spouses is minimized.

However,

considering every possible market for two individuals
simultaneously may be extremely costly.
imperfect information and high co s t
'opt to locate where the husband ' s
zero: the wife will
market as given.

Thus, given

of search, the family may

overqualification level

then minimize her own Z, taking the

To the extent that human capital of
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is

husbands greatly exceeds that of wives, this sequential
optimization may closely approximate the results of
simultaneous optimization.

Under this scheme, the husband

can achieve global op t imization -- ju s t
counterpart.

like his singl e

Thu s for a hu s band,

( 2 . 9)

where N

= the number of jobs in total market system

n1

=

the number of

jobs in large ma r ket

no

=

the numb er of

jobs in small market

For a wife, on the other hand, optimization ta k e s pla c e
only in a local market.

The number of vacancies in the given

market determines her optimal overqualification level,

z-.

To be more specific,

(2.10)

The number of vacancies in the local market is inversely
related to

z-,

as also illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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FIGURE 2.2
OVERQUALIFICATION LEVELS IN MAR KETS OF UNEQUAL SIZE
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To conclude, the effect of overqualification is greater

for individuals with more specific human capital.
overqualification level

If the

is a factor in wage determination,

then the penalty for a wife's being tied should be greate r
for women with h i gher levels of specific human capital.

And

for a given level of spe c if ic human capital, the
overqualification level of a tied person should be inversely

related to the si z e of the local mar k et.

2.4.2

Employer Monopsony

Overqualification is one manifestation of the locational

tie associated with married women in a small city.

But there

is another possibl e ma rk et condition that may negatively
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affect women's
monopsony

of

powe~

conside~ed,

a~eas

by the

concent~ation

of the

ave~age

individual

~atio

fi~ms

is sufficiently

possibiltiy of the

p~evalence

These

a~e

obse~vations

firms in

p~ivate

exe~t

monopsony

do no seem to be affected

supply

labo~
la~ge

to

mobility in the United States.

But the

with the

specifically associated with

the

<Nelson [197 3 ]).

~elatively
gene~al

geog~aphic

ma~ried

to the

cu~ve

~eject

of monopsony

in line with the

such studies do not deal

economy is

<Bunting [1962]), and the estimate

elasticity of the

fi~m

ove~all

in the United States

Wage s paid by these

powe~.

When the

employe~s.

is little evidence that

the~e

met~opolitan

in small city-- the potential

ea~nings

high

labo~

f~amewo~k

of

immobility

women.

Despite evidence against monopsony in the economy as a
whole,

the~e

a~e

indications that monopsony may

the case of special occupational

ma~kets

will see, have found that the
in small towns and

fo~

g~oups.

public school
a~e

consolidated school districts

p~evail

in

Some studies, as we

fo~

~egiste~ed

teache~s

in

nu~ses

la~ge

monopsonistic to some

extent.
Link and Landon [1975] found a substantial
monopsony

behavio~

on the wage level of

influence of

~egiste~ed

nu~ses.

Thei~ study is based on the fact that ove~ 70 pe~cent of the

hospitals in the United States a~e the only ones in thei~
communities.

With the limited

geog~aphic

mobility of

nu~ses,

labo~ supply of nu~ses such local hospitals face a~e likely
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Using national

to be inelastic.
sixty-five U.S.

cities <the

su~vey

la~gest

small cities of 20,000 to 250,000 ,
of hospitals

we~e

d~awn

hospitals in each city

~anged

results indi c ate that the
by the

natu~al

percent of the

in population), a sample
The

numbe~

L ink and Landon ' s

concent~ation

loga~ithm

of

He~findahl

va~iation

in

nu~ses'

~ate

index)

nu~ses

with B.S.

and

othe~

(measu~ed

can explain 15

salaries.

index is associated with $400 less in annual

empi~ical

alone,

Link and

Landon also calculated that a doubling in the

salaries for

of

one to ten, and the usable

f~om

sample included 3 17 hospitals.

f~om

fifty cities and fifteen

each city.

f~om

data collected

He~findahl
sta~ting

degrees.

This result

is consistent with the prediction of the monopsony
hypotheseis in the nursing sector and confirms

ea~lier

findings by Hurd [197 3 ].
Another example of
Bai~d

Landon and

public school
profession,

[1971] in

teache~s.

whethe~

monopsony is provided by

employe ~

thei~

study of the wage level of

Since teaching is a skilled

alte~native

employment in the

p~ofession

is available o ~ not dete ~ mines labo~ supply elasticities to
any given

employe~.

dist~ict s in

If

the~e

a~e

many competing school

a met ~ opolitan a~ea, even the locally tied

teachers can have a number of potential employers.

Using

1966-67 national cross-sectional data on 136 school districts
Which had enrollment s
empi~ically

of mo~e than 25,000, the authors

e x amined whethe~ the numbe~ of school dist~ict s

in the county had an impact on the contractual salary of
beginning teachers.

The number of school districts was shown

to be positively related to the salary

level~

relation was highly statistically significant.
concluded that the more districts in a

county~

and the
The authors
the less

monopsony power possessed by the district and the higher the
salaries of beginning teachers.
The two studies just reviewed provide convincing evidence
of monopsony in the market for nurses and teachers.

One

should note that individuals in these two occupations have
something in common;
predominantly female.

they are relatively highly skilled and
Reinforced by the fact that their

employment is limited to their narrowly defined occuapations,
the locational

tie may be the cause of the monopsonistic wage

determination of these groups.

7

If the problem of the locational tie affects most adult
married women, then the monopsony problem may not be confined
just to these two occupations.

It may affect women in a

Wider range of occupations, particularly those requiring
specialized skills.

Thus the logical next step is to explor e

monopsony induced by the locational tie in a broader conte x t.
With this in mind~ the following chapter will model employer
monopsony in more generally applicable ways.
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Summary

A causal relationship between the traditional sexual
division of labor within the family and its economic
consequences for women was presented.

Perhaps the best way

to summarize these connections is to illustrate it with a
chart.

Figure 2.3 presents the supply-side effects of the

typical role of female in the family.

FIGURE 2.3
SUPPLY-SIDE EFFECTS OF TRADITIONAL SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR
Shorter Future
Labor Force
Participation

of
r---~

Shorter Past
Labor Force
Participation

Investment

Lower Investment
Intensity per
Market Hour

Tie

Market
Effects
as shown in
Fig. 2.4

The traditional sexual division of labor between husband
and wife makes women less attached to the market.

A typical

Working wife works fewer hours and with less expenditure of
energy per hour

(often by choosing less demanding jobs>

the market than her husband.

in

The result is that women may

have less market human capital compared to men of equal

age

and schooling.

Becau se of the lowe r

wife, the locational de c ision of a

market

investment of th e

family is often dominated

bY the husband ' s employment oppo r tunity.

Thus women ' s

searches may typically involve only the local

j ob

labor market.

Besides the supply - side effects outlined earlier, wom e n in
a small city may e x perien c e additional disadvantages induced
by their

locational

tie s when they enter the labor marke t :

the overqualification problem and employer monopsony.
two poss ibilities are not mutually exclu s ive.

The se

Any

combination of them is possible as illustrated in Figure 2.4.

~

F IGU RE 2 . 4

MAR KET EFFECTS OF LOCATIONAL TIE:
POSSIB E OUT COMES FOR WOM EN IN A SMALL CITY

Elastic
Lab o r Sup p ly

Com p etition

( a)

~--~Monopsony
Inlastic
Labor Supply

(b)

No Ove r qual if i cation

Locational
Tie

E lastic
Labor Supply

Competition

(c )

Monopsony

(d)

Over-qual ification
Inela s ti c
Labor suppl y

Outcome (a), where tied women suffer from neither
overqualification nor

monop s on y,
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is mo s tly applicable to

The implied wage level for outcome

in a large city.
(a>

is w

VMF'

= VMF'* = w*

in a small city are

(b),

More likely outcomes for women

<c>, and

(d).

The implied wage

levels for these three categories are:
for outcome

(b), w

for outcome

(c), w

<

VMP•

=

w*

(monopsony only>;

<

VMP*

=

w*

(overqualification

<

VMP*

=

w*

(both

VMF'
VMP

only>;
for outcome (d), w

<

VMP

overqualification and monopsony>;
where

w

=

actual wage received

w*

=

competitive wage in the optimally matching job

VMP = the value of marginal

product to the actual

employer
VMP*= the value of marginal

product to the employer

in the optimally matching job

A monopsonistic model of wage determination explicitly
dealing with women ' s

locational ties should be developed.

The following chapter will

expand the standard monopsony

model to explicitly incorporate women's locational ties.
Three types of occupations--defined on the basis of gender
mix and wage gap between the sexes--will be examined:
segregated occupations, mixed discriminating occupations, and
mixed non-discriminating occupations.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

detailed discussions, see Polachek [1975, pp. 451470], Becke~ [1985, pp. S33-S58J.
1•

Fo~

2. The second effect would lead to somewhat

highe~ wage s
in life and lowe~ wages later on.
At equilibrium the
two effects are equal in terms of discounted values: highe r
wages ea~ly in life will exactly offset lower wages later on.
In terms of current value s , however, lower wage s in late life
dominate.
ea~ly

3. Between 1975- 78, about 25 percent of the men and women in
twenties in the U.S. migrated between counties or
between state s [Ehrenberg and Smith (1982), p. 276].
Thus i t
is not excessive to say that the p~obability of migration of
unattached adults is appro>: i matel y 25 percent.

thei~

4.

Howeve~,
families may decide not to move together if the
costs of maintaining two separate ~esidences in different
geog~aphic areas is less than the expected losses associated
from the family tie.
The solution of "commuter marriage" is
likely adopted more by professional couples with a high level
of specialized skills when both spouses have a similar level
of market productivity and labor force attachment.
These
families may find the indi~ect cost s of being together too
costly to absorb.

Suppose that each spouse has a set of possible locations
offering different levels of personal economic opportunities.
Let G•h and G-_ stand fo r maximum obtainable gains for
husband and wife.
Let o*h and D*- stand for destinations
where G*h and G*- can be obatained.
cD*h and n-_ will be the
same only by coincidence.
When they are not, nonzero
externalities caused by migration ties will be imposed on the
family.
The externalties stemming from migration ties can be
defined as the sum of the discrepancies between the actual
and potential ma x imum gains of each spouse:

Where Gh~ and G-• are the actual gains of husband and wife at
Da. Therefore, the term in the first parentheses represent s
the externalities at n~ imposed on the husband, the term in
the second parenthe s es, those imposed on the wife.
When D*h and D*- are not the same, families can make the
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decision on where to locate in two ways:

(a)

they can choose

a location that minimizes T, the combined externalities
stemming from the ties of the husband and wife; or <b> they
can choose D-n or D*-·
Option <a> is consistent with the
maximization of the combined income of the family.
If the
couple follows this strategy, they will have to search for a
pair of jobs in all possible locations simultaneously.
The
outcome of this search is likely to force both spouses to
give up their personal optimum.
Under option (b), however,
only one spouse gives up his or her personal optimum.
The personal cost of the migration ties increases with the
value of T~Y~.
To the extent that husbands as a group have
higher values of TsYs than wives, choosing D*n will produce a
result that is close to the minimization of T, the sum of the
externalities caused by the migration ties of both spouse s .

6.

Perhaps one can regard education up to high school as
general human capital investment and postsecondary schooling
as specific human capital investment.
Since they are employed in the occupations for which they

e trained, the overqualification problem may not be
gnificant.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MONOPSONY THEORY

Literally speaking, a labor monopsony exists when there is
only one employer in a closed labor market.

But more

generally, monopsony is associated with an employer who faces
a labor supply which is less than perfectly elastic.

As

discussed in the previous chapter, the labor supply curve of
married women to a firm in a small town
relative geographic immobility>
compared to that of men.

(due to their

is likely to be inelastic

Thus one can argue that even if a

married woman in a small town is lucky enough to be employed
in her optimal occupation, or not to suffer a

loss from

overqualification, i t does not necessarily mean that she will
not incur a wage penalty due to her geographic immobility.

3.1

Standard Monopsony Model

A direct realtionship between the monopsonistic wage and
the labor supply elasticity is derived from the theory of
Profit maximization.

Assuming for simplicity that labor is

the only variable input,
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<3.1> Max pf<x> - w<x>x
where p

=

price of output

x

=

units of labor hired

w

=

wage

The inverse supply function of labor, w(x), indicates the
wage level at which workers are willing to offer the combined
amount of x units of labor.

(3.2)

The first - order condition is

[pf'(x)- w<x>J I

w<x>

=

1/e

where e is the wage elasticity of the labor supply to the
firm.

Equation

(3.2>

tells us that the proportional excess

of value of marginal product over wage is inversely related
to the supply elasticity of labor.

Thus the inverse of the

supply elasticity to the firm measures its monopsonistic
power.
If workers are perfectly mobile, then e
the number of local employers.

=

oo regardless of

The wages of mobile workers

are thus independent of local conditions.

Such a situation

is applicable to male workers regardless of marital status,
since they are geographically more mobile.

But for women,

marital status is a critical determinant of geographical
mobility.

Therefore for married women, given their

locational tie, the local market condition may become a
determinant of wages.

The number of employers in a local
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market will directly affect the labor supply elasticities of
married women, and thus their wages.

The smaller the number

of potential employers in a given occupation, the more
inelastic will be the pro-rata labor supply curve to the
employer.

<The labor supply curve of individuals with

narrowly specialized job skills will be even more sensitive
Thus equation

to market size.)

<3.3)

w.

(3.4>

w~

=

VMP. I

(1

VMP~

<1 +

I

+ 1 I

1 I

(3.2) can be modified as:

e.>

e~

>

where subscripts, sand 1 represent small and large markets
The fact that e. < e1 implies that w. < w1 ,

respectively.
assuming MP.

3.2

=

MP1 and p.

=

p 1 or VMP.

=

VMP 1 .

Monopsony Models by Occupational Categories

As mentioned in the previous chapter, despite the lack of
evidence of monopsony in economy as a whole, there is some
evidence that it exists in specific occupational groups, most
notably in the case of nurses and public school teachers.

It

may be that monopsony is more observable when special groups
are considered, particularly when their members have
relatively high levels of specialized skills.
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This is

because individuals in specialized occupations have
potential

employe~s

given local

women

fu~the~

~einfo~ce

Of

a~ising

to

monopsonist

theo~y

disc~iminating

tie may

mig~ation

monopsonist

chapte~

will

of monopsonistic wage
the

gende~-specific

occupations,
fo~

monopsonist

distinction allows us to
diffe~ent

in mind, this

types of occupations:

seg~egated

non-disc~iminating

monopsony on

immobilitiy of

labo~

supply

I shall develop monopsony models

fi~m.

diffe~ent

fo~

~elative

the family

inco~po~ate

elasticity to the
applicable to

f~om

conside~ations

standa~d

dete~mination

the

cou~se,

monopsony.

With the above
extend the

than those in low-skilled ones in any

ma~ket.

ma~~ied

fewe~

(b) the

mixed occupations, and
fo~

p~edict

mixed occupations.

the

diffe~ential

kinds of occupations.

three monopsony models is

(a) the

p~esented

explained in the following sections.
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<c> the
This

impact of

Each of the

in Table 3.1 and

Table 3.1

THREE TYPES OF MONOP SON Y IN A SMALL LO CAL LABOR MAR KET
Production
Function

VMP

Ela s tic itie s

Wages

Comments
male and fema l e
wor kers are not
substitutable

e,.. >e,..

male and female
workers are
substitutable

e,.. >e,.

Nonf

3.2.1

( X,..+ X,. )

w,..=w,.. for
instituti onal
reasons

VM P,..=VM P,.

Segregated Occupations

There are occupations in which the workers are almost
exclusively of one gender group.

1

Across segregated

occupations the VMPF is in general not equal to VMPM since
the VMPs are specific to the occupations.

Let us define a

female segregated occupation as one in which the proportion
of female workers exceeds, say, 90 percent and a male
Segregated occupation as one in which the proportion of
female workers is less than 10 percent.

While some

Occupations such as security guards, firefighters, engineers,
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and models for men ' s clothing are segregated male
occupations, others such as nurses, kindergarten teachers,
and fashion models are female segregated occupations.
Let the profit of the monopsonist, who hires employees in
both types of segregated occuaptions, be:

Thus the profit maximization condition is:

The implication is that the ratio of the male to female wages
is directly related to the elasticity of male labor supply
and inversely related to elasticity of the female labor
supply.

If the sex differentials of supply elasticities are

larger in a small city, the ratio of male to female wages
should be larger.

3.2.2

Discriminating Monopsonists for Mixed Occupations

By a "discriminating monopsonist", we mean a profit
maximizing employer who is in a position to pay different
Wages to men and women in the same occupation.
occupation", we mean an occupation in which VMPF
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By a "mixed

=

VMPM.

In

other words, men and women are perfect substitutes in terms
of productivity and skill; the production function is
This case is analogous to Pigouvian
third-degree price discrimination in the product market.

The

discriminating monopsonist can divide equally qualified
workers into two independent groups by sex.

If each group

has a different elasticity of labor supply to the employer,
the profit-maximizing behavior of the employer will result in
a sexual wage differential.

For this case, the profit

function is:

where XF and XM represent the number of workers of females
and males.

Since VMPF

If eF

<

From the first-order conditions:

VMPM by definition,

eM, then the wage ratio of males to females will be

greater than one.

Hence, again, the smaller the size of the
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labor market, the larger the wage differential between men
and women.

Non-Discriminating Monopsonists for Mixed Occupations

In this model, the employer hires both men and women for
given occupation and recognizes the different labor supply
elasticties of each sex,

just as discriminating monopsonist

However, the non-discriminating monopsonist is
to or cannot

(for institutional reasons) pay

wages to the two groups.

the

is:

(3.11)

The first-order conditions is:

0

t

is the proportion of females employed.

of men and women are the same, w ' (t)

<

0.

< t <

Although the
Therefore,

the wage level is negatively related to the proportion of
Women in the occupation.
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1

Monopsonistic Profits in the Long-Run

The geographic immobility of labor is often regarded as a
phenomenon.

Since the employer monopsony model

certain degree of labor immobility, it may appear
that monopsonistic wage determination is not sustainable in
the long-run.

However, the geographic immobility of married

women induced by locational ties may persist as long as they
married, particularly to husbands who earn more than
do.

Thus the monopsonistic exploitation by employers

married women face may continue to prevail even in the

However, i t is questionable whether the monopsonist can
profits obtained in this way indefinitely.
are underlying factors inherent in the market economy
may prevent the monopsonistic firm from keeping its
For example, if a firm enjoys monopsonistic
then it may eventually have to face the threat of
In order to prevent potential new entries, the
firm will be driven to make appropriate adjustments that will
reduce its economic profits in the long-run.

To see how this

the profit maximization condition for monopsonists
from equation (3.2)

(3.13)

pf'(>: )

=

is reproduced as:

w

<1

+

1/e)
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which simply states that the VMP of an additional unit of
labor should be equal to its marginal cost.

The firm can

impose entry barriers by reducing its profit level, either by
making adjustments to p, the price of its products or to w,
the wage it pays to its workers.

A primary factor in

determining which adjustment the firm will make is the nature
of the product market.
If the firm is a producer of local goods, then the price
of these goods is determined within the local market.

If

the

local market is small, the firm might lower the price of its
product in order to prevent new entries •

In this case, the

.anopsonistic profits wrung from immobile employees are
transferred to consumers.

The immobile employees of the

local goods producing monopsonist will receive wages lower
than their VMP even in the long-run.
If the monopsonist produces export goods, which are sold
in a national market, then the price of the goods, assuming
perfect competition in the product market, is determined in
the national market.

In this case, since the product's price

cannot be adjusted to prevent new entries, the firm may have
to adjust by raising the wages of its employees.

Thus the

Markers employed by a national goods producer, even if they
remain immobile, may receive more than monopsonistic wages in
the long-run.
The discussion above showed how the monopsonist may reduce
his supranormal profits by voluntary moves to block the entry
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of new

fails to take the
competito~s

app~op~iate

do actually

the competition will
local good>,
result is
Quite
othe~

o~

mo~e

.anopsonist.

To be

sup~ano~mal

profits.
And such
Ionge~

the

p~ices
o~

action, and new
In this instance,

ma~ket.

down

(in the case of a

In any event the end

both.

these adjustments,

f~om

fo~ces

position to

d~ive

p~eventive

less the same.

ma~ket

enjoys

ente~

wages up,
o~

apa~t

suppose the monopsonist

Alte~natively,

competito~s.

that may
mo~e

will

Landlo~ds,
p~essu~es

fo~

the

the~e

p~ofits

a~e

of the

specific, as long as the monopsonist

p~ofits,

ba~gain

supp~ess

howeve~,

facto~

p~essu~e

owne~s

the

who

fi~m

to

example, will demand

a~e

in a

sha~e
highe~

its
~ents.

may continue until the monopsonist no

enjoys economic

p~ofits.

To conclude, the special kind of monopsonistic
•xploitation facing immobile
corrected by the

ma~ket

farces may be able to
to

ze~o.

ma~~ied

system even in the

d~ive

long-~un.

the monopsonist's economic

But this will be done by

~nopsonistic

women cannot be
Ma~ket

p~ofit

~edistributing

profits, not by correcting the monopsonistic

•xploitation itself.

For the geographic immobility

associated with married women does not change even in the
long-run, so long as their earning power is less than that of
their husbands.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. Such sexual segregation may occur when the gender
characteristics are themselves the direct determinant of
productivity in certain occupations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DATA

The main implication of the theoretical analysis is that
the wages of married women will rise more rapidly than those
of married men as the size of local labor market increases.
Since the size of the local labor market plays such a pivotal
role~

the critical information needed for this study is

nation-wide identification of individuals by SMSA <Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area).

The only microdata source

which provides this information is the 1980 Public-Use
Microdata Samples <PUMS>.

It is the first time a census

sample has reported the location of all respondents residing
in SMSAs.

<The 1970 PUMS provided this information only for

the 125 SMSAs with a population of over 250,000.>

Since the

machine-readable data identifies the SMSA only by code, the
population of each SMSA was obtained from printed census
publications.
In the 1980 PUMS, there are three independently drawn
samples, each of which features a different geographic
Scheme.

1

The only sample which identifies SMSAs is B Sample.

Out of the total of 318 SMSAs, it identifies the 282 having a
POpulation of 100,000 or more.
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SMSAs of less than 100,000

population were not coded in the B Sample in order to avoid
possible disclosure of information about identifiable
households and individuals.

Also~

"due to confidentiality

constraints, the information on income is given only up to
$75~000.

Since the samples provide data for all individuals living
in sampled households, which are identified by serial number,
one can create within-family data to examine the inter-family
effects of personal variables.
There are 53 files in B Sample: a 1 percent sample file
for each state and the District of Columbia; a 1 percent
sample file for all county groups in the nation crossing
state lines;
nation.

and a .1 percent sample file for the entire

The national one-in-one-thousand file was chosen

since it contains an appropriate number of observations while
being relatively easy to manage.

In the unedited national

file, there were 226,524 individuals from 94,254 households.
My subsample included only individuals of working age
(sixteen years of age or older and sixty five years of age or
younger) with earned income, who worked at least one week
during the previous year and at least one hour during the
census week.

Those serving in the military or living in

group quarters were excluded.
residents of non-SMSA areas.

Also excluded were the
After all these individuals

Were deleted, there were 60,586 persons left in the
SUbsample.

Table 5.1 reports the means and standard
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deviations of key variables.

TABLE 4.1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
<N = 60,586)

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

8.21

7.71

AGE

39.37

12.26

EDUCATION

12.85

3.04

EXPERIENCE

20.52

13.05

0.44

0.50

FERTILITY

2.01

1.80

SMSA SIZE

2.25

2.55

WAGE

SEX

(femal e=1)

Note:
WAGE = annual earned income/Cweeks worked*hours
worked per week)
EDUCATION = years of schooling completed
EXPERIENCE = Age - Education - 6
FERTILITY = the number of children ever born for
female, 0 for male
SMSA SIZE = SMSA population in millions
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. See U.S. Bureau of Census <1983> for more details
concerning the census in general and the PUMS in particular.
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CHAPTER FIVE

"ALE-FEMALE WAGE GAPS AND THE SIZE OF THE LOCAL LABOR MARKET:
ESTIMATION

To test whether the geographic migration tie imposed on
married women amplifies wage differentials between the sexes
the following earnings function is used.

(5 • 1 > w

=

F1

(

X , S , M, SM >

where X represents a vector of personal human capital
characteristics such as scooling and work experience.
dummy variable for sex

<S

=

1 if female and S

=

S is a

0 if male>

and M represents the size of the local labor market, measured
by the SMSA size.

In a way, the SMSA size can be regarded as

a variable controlling for all location-specific amenities
that are related to city size affecting men and women
equally.

S can be regarded as a control for sex differences

independent of market size.

It follows that the coefficient

of SM, the interaction term of the sex variable and market
size, will represent the net effect of SMSA size on women's
Wages relative to men's wages.
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Control Variables

~.1

Following the convention of earning fuction estimation,
standa~d

human capital

va~iables

These include schooling,

se~ve

expe~ience,

as

cont~ol

experience

va~iables.

squa~ed,

In accord with prior estimates of earnings functions,

etc.

I

expect years of schooling and years of work experience to be
positively associated with earnings producing coefficients at
order of magnitude roughly equal to market rates of return
investment.

In the absence of more direct data,

fertility, the number of children
women ' s

born, is included to

labor force participation intermittency

and reduced duration.

Polachek

eve~

Following the findings of Mincer and

<1974>, it is expected that the fertility variable

is negatively associated with the earnings of women since it
is directly related to years spent at home, out of the labor
force.

S.2

City Size

The main explanatory variable is the city size variable.
As indicated, by interacting the city size with the sex dummy
Variable, the effect of city size on the wages of men and
Women are separately measured.

In accordance with previous

investigations of the relationship between earnings and city
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size [Clark, Kahn, and Ofek

<1988>, Fuchs <1968)]

I expect

city size to have a positive impact on both male and female
wage level due to cost of living, unionization, commuting
costs, and compensation for other urban disamenities.

Thus

the coefficient of M may overestimate the impact of local
labor market size on wage level.

Fortunately though, this

bias is likely to affect both sexes equally <through the
coefficient of M>, and thus not critically affecting the
coefficient of the interaction SM.

5.3

Results

The ordinary least-squares results of the earnings
equations for married men and women are presented in Table

5.1.

In the linear specification with respect to city size

(Column 1), the estimates indicate that the male wage level
will increase by 1.3 percent for each increment of a million
in city size.

For females the wage level is expected to

increase by 2.2 percent for the same increment of city size,
and the difference <.022 -

.013

=

.009) is statistically

significant at the level of .01 percent.

The results

indicate that a married female worker's penalty for being
confined to a local labor market gets smaller as city size
increases.

This supports the hypothesis developed earlier:

the negative impact of the geographic migration tie on
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relative earnings of women is inversely related to city size.
The result obtained from the quadratic specification
(Column 2), too, is consistent with the hypothesis.

The wage

level, which increases with city size but at a decreasing
rate, reaches its peak at a different city size for men and
women.

Male wages peak at a city size of 5 million and

female wages at a city size of 9.5 million.

1

The fact that

female wages peak at the largest city in the sample indicates
that female wages, unlike those of males, increase with city
size monotonically in the relevant range of the data.
Table 5.2 shows the impact of labor market size on the
wages of never married individuals.

Like the married group,

the wages of singles increase with city size at a rate of 1.6
percent per million.

However, contrary to the married group,

the additional increment in wages for women is only .5
percent and is not statistically significant.

Since the F-

ratio obtained from the Chow test is 1.4 <the critical value
is 1>, we can reject the hypothesis that the two groups have
identical slopes.

This result implies that, for women,

marital status is a factor in determining the sensitivity of
their wages to city size.

This further supports the

hypothesis of a migration tie associated with married women.
For an additional test of the hypothesis,

I also examine

the husband-wife wage ratio using the paired sample of twoearner couples.

Within-family data, where the unit of

observation is the family rather than an individual, is
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created by pairing the individual data for married couples.
such a sample controls for otherwise unobservable familyspecific variables, such as the length of marriage, the
spacing of children, family wealth, patterns of division of
labor between spouses, etc.

The following function is fitted

to the sample.

(5.2)

ln

<w....,/w ... >

=

F2

<X....,, X... , M >

where X...., and x... denote the human capital variables of husband
and wife respectively, and M stands for the SMSA size.

The

results in Table 5.3 indicate that the husband-wife wage
ratio declines as the SMSA size becomes larger.

For each

increment of one million in the SMSA population, the ratio
declines by 2 percent, thus narrowing the wage gap between
husband and wife.

This result further confirms that wives

suffer economic penalties -- although they can be alleviated
to some extent in large labor markets
migration tie5.

because of family

Note that compared to the estimates obtained

from the unpaired sample <Table 5.1>, the estimated response
of the male-female relative wage to city size in the paired
sample is roughly twice as sensitive <2 percent per million
compared with .9 percent per million).

The mere fact that

the results differ is not particularly surprising, because
the two samples differ in a systematic way.

2

<Recall that

the paired sample is confined to two-earner couples.)
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But

it provides strong evidence of compensating substitution in
earning power for two-earner families, as implied by Mincer's
rules of optimal migration.

That is, potential employers in

small cities will have to "bribe" husbands -- by paying
higher wages -- in order to compensate for the forseeable
loss of employment opportunities for their working wives.
From the results of the within-family data, one can also
see that another factor may be operating.

As noted in

section 2.3, when both the husband and wife have high earning
power, it is more costly to be locationally tied to a small
city and more likely that they will locate in a large city.
Such couples are likely to be overrepresented in the sample
of two-earner couples compared to the sample of individuals,
which may explain the relatively larger impact of city size
on the sexual wage gap when within-family data are used.

S.4

Potential Biases

One source of potential bias is the sample selection
problem.

3

The

f ~ ct

that tied wives in a small city may

become unemployed or drop out of the labor force altogether
poses a question of

select~vity

bias.

The potential decrease

in their earnings, which - would contribute to widening the
wage gap between men and women, should they remained
employed, is not captured by this study.
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In other words,

those who may be the biggest losers from the family migration
tie may be systematically excluded from the sample since they
receive no wages and cannot be included in the estimation of
earnings equations.

Quite likely, this effect will lead to

an underestimation of the net impact of city size on women's
earnings.
One way to examine the seriousness of the selectivity bias
is to investigate whether the labor force participation rate
of women is affected by city size.

If women's labor force

participation rate is lower in a small city than in a large
city, then the bias is more likely to be serious.

The result

of a logistic regression obtained from the sample of women,
presented in Table 5.4, indicates that there is no
significant impact of city size on the labor force
participation of women.

The coefficient of SMSA size is both

negligible in the magnitude and statistically insignificant
at 5 percent level.

Thus one can infer that the labor force

participation is not systematically related to city size and
that the sample selection bias is not a serious problem for
the models in this study.
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5.5

Male-Female Wage Gaps Explained by the City Size

If married women·s wages, as our findings indicate, are
more positively sensitive to SMSA size than those of married
men, then one important implication can be derived:

at least

some of the income differential between married men and women
This allows us to quantify

can be explained by SMSA size.

the proportion of the residual wage gap between the sexes
attributable to city size.

Since SMSA size affects the

discrimination coefficient (@WAGE/@SEX :
the linear specification; @WAGE/@SEX :
.005 SMSA 2

-.529 + .009SMSA in

-.493 -

.003 SMSA +

in the quadratic specification>, transferring all

individuals somehow into larger cities would automatically
decrease the magnitude of the unexplained wage gap between
the sexes.

For example, from the quadratic specification the

discrimination coefficient for New York City is -.385 <-.493
-

.005*9 2

-

.03 3•9> while the discrimination coefficient of

an average small town with a population, say, of 1,000 is
about -.493.

Thus, taking these figures at face value, if a

Woman moves from a small town to New York City, her wage is
likely to increase by 10.8 percent
factors constant.

<.493 -.385) holding other

Now let us imagine for a moment that the

Whole population of the United States moved to a city the
Size of New York.

The resulting change in the discrimination

coefficient, after such an exodus took place can be
Calculated using the actual distribution of the
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population.~

The SMSA coefficient is used as a cross-sectional deflator
for the

disc~imination

coefficient.

The results of this

calculation are tabulated in Table 5.5.

The base for the

calculation is set at a city size of 9 million, which is the
population of New York.
diffe~ential

would
vo~k.

that is not explained by

disappea~

Put

In 1980, 5.7 percent of the wage

if

eve~yone

diffe~ently,

othe~

cont~ol

va~iables

moved to a city the size of New

about 12

pe~cent

(5.7/49.3) of the

total residual wage gap between men and women can be
explained by SMSA size.e
The same technique is applied to the years of 1950, 1960,
and 1970.

The discrimination coefficient deflators have

decreased each decade as urbanization has increased.

But the

magnitude of the change is minimal; during the

of

pe~iod

1950-1980, the size of the deflator decreased from 6.43 to
5.71 or by only .7 percent.

This result is in line with the

observation that the male-female wage gap has persisted with
little change

ave~

the decades, at least in the case of

married women and men.
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TABLE 5. l
CITY SIZE AND WAGES: MARRIED INDIVIDUALS
Dependent Variable: Ln Hourly Wage
T-Statistics in parenthesis
!N = 46,495)

-------- -------- --- -- ------ ----- -- -- --- --- ------- ----------- --- -------- ----- (I) Linear

(2) Quadratic

----------------- ------------- -- ------------ ---------- --- --- ---- -- ----- --- -- .985 ( 62. I l

.946 (58.5)

.06 3 (67.8 )

. 062 ( 6 7 . 1)

.025 ( 30 .9)

.025 ( 30.

7)

-. 0003 (-20.4 )

- .0003 ( -20. 4)

- . 529 ( -75 . 0 )

-.49 3 ( - 52.9)

- .009 ( -6. 3)

-.0 09 ( -6. 2)
. 071 ( 14. 8)

. 0 13 (9. 9 )

-.00 7 ( -1 2 .5 )

** *
.0 09 ( 4.

-.0 33 ( -4. 3 )

2)

* * *

.005 (5.

.267

.270

7)

----------- --- --- ------ ---- -- -- ----------------------------- ------ ---- WAGE=annual income / (weeks wor ked•hours wor ked per wee k)
EDU C=years of schooling completed
EXP=age - EDU C- 6
SEX=! for female , 0 for male
FERT=number of ch i ldren ever born for female, 0 for male
SMSA =S MSA population in ~illions
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TABLE 5.2
CITY SIZE AND WAGES: NEVER "ARRIED INDIVIDUALS
Dependent Variable: Ln Hourly Wage
T-Statistics in Parenthesis
(N = 6,320)

------------ ---- ---- ------------------ --- ------------------------------ -- ---(1) Linear

(2) Quadratic

.65 6 ( 15. 6)

. 610 ( 14. 1 )

.065 ( 25. 2)

.064 ( 25. 1)

.040 ( 19. 3)

.040 ( 19.2)

-.0006 ( -13.4)

-.0007 ( -13. 3)

-. 186 ( 8. 8)

-. 1 7 1 (-6.2)

-.0 04 ( -0.8)

-.0 0 4 (-0.8)

. 0 17 (5. 1)

.070 (5 . 3)

***

-.006 ( -4.2)

. 00 5 ( 1 . 0 )

-.012 (-. 7l
.002 ( 1 . 0)

* **

. 177

. 17 4

--------------------------------------------------------------- -- -- -WAGE=yearly earnings/(weeks worked•hours worked)
EDUC=years of schooling completed
EXP=age-EDUC - 6
SEX=1 for female, 0 for •ale
FERT=number of children ever born for female, 0 for male
SMSA=SMSA population in millions
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TABLE 5.3
CITY SIZE AND HUSBAND-WIFE WAGE RATIO
Dependent Variable: Ln (Wh/W .. l
T-Statistics in Parenthesis
!N = 16,432!

( 1)

(2)

--------- ---- ------ -------------------------------------------------------.354 ( 8. 24 )
.0456 ( 15. 42)

** *

-.0530 (-15.92)

* **
. 0 493 ( 17.28)

** *
.0279 ( 8. 51)

***

-.0 056 (- 1.65 )

** *
.0071 (5. 35)

* * *
-.00 0 4 ( -6. 96 )

* **

.0 0007 ( 1. 02)

***
-.00 0 1 (-2.45)

** *
-.0206 ( -9. 31)
.0198 ( 4. 21)

. R2

.426 ( 23. 3)

- .0184 (-8.32)
.0462 (11.67l

.0 30

.0 38

----------------------- -- ------------ ------------- ----- -------------HEDUC=husband ' s education
WEDUC=wife ' s education
HEXP=husband ' s experience
WEXP=wife ' s e x perience
SMSA=SMS A population in millions
FERT=number of children ever born to wife
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TABLE 5.4
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND CITY SIZE:
LOGIT ESTIMATION
Dependent Variable: Labor Force Status
(N = 36, 097)

Coefficient

Asymptotic
T- Statistics

INTERCEPT

0 . 398

5. 0

EDUCATION

0.091

2 (1, 1

EXPERIEN CE

- 0 .015

-1 7. 1

FERTILITY

-(1. 084

-12.2

MARITAL

-0.799

-15.6

SMSA

- 0.005

-1.3

Variable

Note: Labor Force Status = 1 if in labor force ;
MARITAL = 1 if married spouse present;
SMSA = SMS A population in ~illions.
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TABLE 5.5
THE URBANIZATION DEFLATOR OF "SEX DISCRIMINATION" AND THE DISTRIBUTION
OF THE POPULATION BY SM SA POPULATION
SELECTED YEARS: 195 0-1980

PER CENT OF TOTAL POPU LATION
195 0
196 0
19 70
198 0

PROJECTED DECREASE IN
DISCRIMINATION
COEFFICIENT
DEFLATOR"

-------- ---- -- --- -------- -- -- ------ ------- ---- ---- --- --- -------- --- ------ --

-SI'1SA**

ATOR

6. 3
4.2
9.0
0.0
4.4
5.4
8.2
9.6
7.6
1.1
44. 2

5.3
6.8
4.6
0.0
7.6
10. 0
10. 7
8.8
8. 1
1. 0
3 7. 0

7.9
3. 0
4.6
3 .0
7. 2
14. 0
10 .8
9.7
7.4
1. 0
31.4

6.8
2.7
4. 1
2.9
9. 3
15.9
12. 9
10 .6
9.6

100

10 0

10 0

10 0

6.4 3

6.23

5.84

5. 71

•9

24. 1

0
.06 3
.034
. 027
.03 0
.04 3
. 059
. 0 70
. 077
.079
. 081

------- ----- ----------- -- ------- --- ----------- -- --------------- ---------- The projected decrease i n the se x coefficient (discrimination coefficient )
en the ent i re population of the United States is hypothesi z ed to reside in a
ity the si ze of New Yor k is calculated in the following way. First, using
he coefficients of the SMSA variable in Colu~n 2, Table 5.1 and the Midpoint
or each population - interval, the actual deflator of the discriMination
oefficient i s calculated for each population category. The smaller the size
fa city, th e sfflaller the deflator, thus the larger the discri•ination
fficient. For New Yor k , the actual deflator of the discrimination
is . 081 <. 0 05*8.5 2 - . 033 *8.5 1 . The projected change in the se x
oefficient when the entire population of each city - size group mo ve s to a cit y
e size of New Yor k is obtained by subtracting the actual deflator for each
ity size categ ory from . 081.
non - SMS A catego ry , a population of 1,000 was assigned for the the
calculation.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Clark, Kahn, and Ofek (1988) also found that the wage
level of a sample of white males drawn from the CPS data set
was highest at a city size in the range of 4 to 5 million.
2. Suppose that husbands of working women have a higher
reservation wage when considering job openings from employers
in a distant area.
The reservation wage will be greater then
when an opening is in a smaller city and when a wife's market
oriented productivity is high.
Thus husbands of women with
higher market productivity are less likely to move to small
city for they expect larger indirect costs in terms of the
foregone earnings of their wives.
On the other hand,
husbands, whose market-oriented experience substantially
exceeds that of their wives and whose earnings are
substantially more to begin with, are more likely to decide
to migrate to small city if such a move enhances their own
income.
This tends to further widen the wage gap between
them and their wives.
Similarly, Therefore, one is more
likely to observe a wider market productivity gap between a
husband and wife in a small city.
Whether a couple decides
to locate in a small citylargely depends on the couple's
characteristics.
Thus the characteristics of couples living
in a small city might be different from those of couples in a
large city; a small market tends to attract families in which
the husband ' s market productivity far exceeds his wife's.
Theses effects can be captured more accurately by using the
within-family data of two-earners couples.
3. Heckman [1979] treats the sample selection bias as a
specification error and presents a consistent estimation
method which involves the estimation of a selection equation
with a probit function.
4.
Clark, Kahn, and Ofek (1988} employed the same technique
to calculate GNP deflators.

5. If we instead use the results from the linear
specification to calculate the discrimination coefficient
deflators, the figure is slightly larger: about 13 percent of
the residual wage gap then can be explained by city size.
However, the quadratic specification is intuitively more
appealing, because the most dramatic jump in wages with
respect to city size is expected to occur in the range of
smaller cities.
In other words, a migration from Binghamton
to New York is likely produce a greater increa5e in wages per
million increment in population than a migration from Chicago
to New York.
This difference in the slope of the wage curve
60

over the range of city sizes is captured only by the
quadratic specification.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE RATE OF RETURN TO EDUCATION AND CITY SIZE1
A TEST OF OVERQUALIFICATION

In Section 2.4.1, we asserted that the effect of
overqualification should be greater for women with more
specific human capital.

Thus the directly testable

implication is that the positive impact of city size on wage
levels should be larger for more productive women

(presumably

with more specific human capital investments.)
One way to carry out this test is to compare the
magnitudes of the rate of return to human capital for women
in large and small cities.

With the traditional earnings

function, one can estimate the rates of return to educational
attainment and level of work experience.

Of these two, the

education variable is the better one to employ for examining
averqualification.

Not only is it more straightforward to

measure, but the education variable is also conceptually more
relevant than the experience variable to the
averqualification problem.

In a way, overqualification

results from ignorance about future employment and location.
Jab investment tends to be made while an individual has
relatively more information and foresight with respect to her
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actual

job (or occupation) and the specific local labor

market;

it may be less susceptable to overqualification.

differently,

Put

job investment is more likely to be custom-made

and thus less likely to be wasted.

However, schooling

investments tend to be made earlier in life, when an
individual has less certainty about her actual
the location of the geographic labor market.
room for wasting some of the investment.

job as well as
There is more

Schooling

investment, therefore, might be more sensitive to the
overqualification problem and is a better variable to employ
for the testing of overqualification.
The following function was fitted to the subsample of
women to test the overqualification hypothesis.

(6.1)

Ln w =

f

<X, E, M, EM>

where X denotes individual attributes, E education level, M
market size, and EM the interaction term of the last two.
The coefficient of E measures the rate of return to
education.

By examining the coefficient of EM, we can infer

the impact of city size on the rate of return to education.
The overqualification theory predicts that the coefficient of
EM is positive.

But as shown in Table 6.1, the coefficient

of the interaction term is not correctly signed and not
significant.

The result does not conform to the

overqualification hypothesis.
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In

o~de~

to

co~~obo~ate

this

~esult,

an

alte~native

specification can be applied to the sample of

ma~~ied

women.

measu~e

of the

(6.2)

Wh, husband's wage, is used as an
wife's

ma~ket

alte~native

based on its positive

p~oductivity

co~~elation

to wife's wage.
If

is a

ove~qualification

in the wage

facto~

of locationally tied wives in small city, then
women

(p~esumably

with

mo~e

investments) should gain
residing in a

la~ge

high-wage men should be
reg~ession

~esult

than less

fo~

husband's
inc~ease

less

p~oductive

hou~ly

in

he~

pe~

But the

in Table 6.2 indicates that the

women.

wage is one
wage

women by

sensitive to city size.

mo~e

p~esented

p~oductive

Thus the wages of wives of

ma~ket.

positive impact of city size is
than

p~oductive

specific human capital

mo~e

labo~

supp~ession

smalle~

Fa~

della~

fa~

mo~e

p~oductive

example, a woman whose
would have a 3.2

pe~cent

one million increment in city size.

But if the husband ' s wage is 2.5 times the mean log of male
wages (the sample mean is 2.08), the wife's wage is
affected at all
highe~

*

2.5

*

2.08

=

O>.

Thus the

the wife's p~oductivity, as measu~ed by he~ husband's

wage, the
result

(.032- .006

ha~dly

smalle~

cont~adicts

the impact of city size on
the

p~edictions

theo~y.1
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of the

he~

wage.

This

ove~qualification

TABLE 6.1
SMSA SIZE AND THE RATE OF RETURN TO EDUCATION OF WOMEN
Dependent Variable: Ln Wage
T-Statistics in Parenthesis
<N =21 ,631 >
Variable

Intercept

INTERCEPT

.522

(17.4)

EDUC

.068

(34.3)

EXP

.022

(18.5)

EXP 2

-.0003 <-12.4)

SMSA

.025

(3. 7>

EDUC*SMSA

-.001

(-.29)

MS

-.066

(-5.5)

FERT

-.027

(-9.8)

ADJ. R:z

Key:

.115

WAGE=yearly earnings/(weeks worked*hours worked)
EDUC=years of schooling completed
EXP=age-EDUC-6
FERT=number of children ever born
SMSA=SMSA population in millions
MS=1 for married, 0 for never married
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TABLE 6.2
WAGE DETERMINATION OF MARRIED WOMEN:
CITY SIZE AND HUSBAND'S WAGE
Dependent Va~iable: Ln Wage
T- Statistics in Pa~enthesis
<N = 16,432>
Variable

Coefficient

Inte~cept

.297

HEDUC

.0003 (0. 1)

WEDUC

.063

(25.6)

HEXP

-.007

<-2.7)

WEXP

.018

HEXP 2

.0002 ( 3 . 3)

WEXP 2

-.0003 <-5.5)

(7.0)

SMSA

.032

(6.4)

Ln HWAGE

.154

<11. 0)

SMSA*Ln HWAGE

-.006

( - 2.7)

FERT

-.024

(-6.8)

Adj. R:z
Key:

(7. 3 )

.112

HEDUC=husband ' s education
WEDUC=wife ' s education
HEXP=husband ' s experience
WEXP=wife ' s experience
SMSA=SMSA population in millions
FERT=number of children ever born
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Frank [1978] interprets the higher rate of return to city
size for women solely as manifestation of overqualification.
Dividing the sample of professional men and women from the
Survey of Economic Opportunities into five city size
categories, he found that female wages were 7 percent more
sensitive than male wages to city size.
But he does not
consider the possibilty of other factors that might be also
related to city size, such as monopsony.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CITY SIZE EFFECTS FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS:
EXAMPLES OF MONOPSONY

Chapter 5 provided strong evidence of wage suppression of
women induced by the locational tie.

However, the empirical

findings of Chapter 6 did not lend full support to the
overqualification hypothesis.

Exploring alternative

hypotheses is therefore in order.
Among the possible explanations of the locational tie
effect, the main alternative to overqualification is
monopsony.

A test of monopsony can be obtained by estimating

the differential city size effects on the wages of men and
women by occupational groups.

By doing so, we can

automatically eliminate the overqualification possibility at
least in its inter-occupational manifestation.

However, the

occupations selected for this purpose should be those
requiring a high level of specialized training, in order to
reduce the possibiltiy of mobility across occupational lines.
Another point we should be aware of is the possibilty of
intra-occupational overqualification.

We cannot control this

by grouping samples by occupation as defined in the data.
For example, an operating room nurse may be overqualified if
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she has to work as a general pediatric nurse.

However, if

the loss induced by inter-occupation overqualification is a
more serious problem than intra-occuaptional
overqualification, then the city size effects from withinoccupation data may be an adequate measure of the extent of
monopsony.
Since the census data identifies the occupations of
individuals we can employ the same estimation method use in
previous chapters using within-occupation data.
From the three monopsony models presented in Chapter 3,
testable implications for each category are derived and
summarized in Table 7.1.
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TABLE 7.1
EXPECTED SIGNS FOR THE THREE CATEGORIES OF MONOPSONISTS

Monopsonist
for
Segregated
Occupations

Monopsonist for Mixed Occupations
Non-discriminating

b3

>

Discriminating

0

Note: The coefficients correspond to the following estimation
specification.

where X
5

M

=

=
=

human capital variables
sex
market size as measured by SMSA population

The common effect of city size on the wages of men and women
<b3)

is expected to be positive for non-discriminating mixed

occupations, since both men and women are equally subject to
monopsony.

But for the other two types of occupations, it is

not clearly predictable.
size on women's wages

(b~>

The net additional effect of city
is not predictable for the non-

discriminating monopsonist, for gender plays no clear role in
determining the degree of market competition; but it is
expected to be positive for monopsonists for segregated
occupations and discriminating monopsonists for mixed
occupations.

In any case, for all three types of
70

monopsonists, the total effect of city size on the wages of
women (b3 + b4)

is expected to be positive.

To test the implications tabulated in Table 7.1, several
occupations are selected.

The occupations had to be limited

to those that provided a large enough sample and that
required a relatively high level of specialized training.
For individuals in occupations that require less specialized
training may have many potential employers, even in a very
small city, violating a necessary condition for monopsony.
As representative occupations for segregated occupations,
nurses, engineers, physicians, policemen, and firefighters
were selected.
for nurses.

These are male segregated occupations except

Unfortunately, there are no other female-

segregated occupations which require a high level of
specialized training and still provide a large enough sample.
For mixed occupations, postsecondary teachers, public school
teachers, natural scientists, computer equipment operators,
and social scientists were selected.

In the following

sections, we will discuss the empirical results obtained from
the within-occupation data.

7.1

Segregated Occupations

The regression results for the dominating sex in
segregated occupations are reproduced in Table 7.2.
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1

Except for physicians, all occupations have positive
coeffecients of the city size variable.
equation

But as predicted by

(3.6>, the magnitude of the city size coefficient is

greater for nurses, the female-segregated occupation, than
for the three male-segregated occupations.

Nurses· wages

increase by 5.4 percent for each increment of one million in
city size.

For the same increment of city size, the wages of

police and firefighters increase 3.1 and 3.7 percent
respectively for each increment of one million in city size.
The relatively large size of the coefficents of these two
occupations may be related to their high level of
unionization.

Since the unionization rate generally increase

with city size, the city size coeffecient may overestimate
the the true city size effect.

However, the fact that the

nurses ' coeffeicient is much larger than the coefficients of
police and firefighters, even with the possiblity of
overestimation, adds additional strength to this test of the
monopsony model for segregated occupations.
The wages of engineers, perhaps the most comparable malesegregated occupation -- in terms of the required education
and training level -- increase only by 1 percent for each
increment of one million in city size.

This result is

consistent with the prediction of the monopsony model for
segregated occupations.
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7.2

Mixed Occupations

Five occupations were selected as representing mixed
occupations: public school teachers, postsecondary school
teachers, natural scientists, computer equipment operators,
and social scientists.

A common feature all these

occupations share is a fairly mixed male-female structure of
employment.

(The proportion of females in these occupations

ranges from 26 to 72 percent.>

The estimation results for

the five within-occupation data are tabulated in Table 7.3.
The data for public school teachers exhibit negligible sexdifferentials in wages.

But the data for the other four

occupations demonstrate substantial wage differentials
between the sexes, ranging from 15 percent to 44 percent.
Considering that the sex coefficient is estimated controlling
for human capital, fertility, marital status, and occupation,
the size of the "discrimination coefficient" for these
occupations is surprisingly large.

We will test the

discriminating monopsony model against the data for these
four occupations.
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7.2.1

Examples of Discriminating Monopsony: Postsecondary
Teachers, Natural Scientists,Social Scientists, and
Computer Equipment Operators

Although the census data for postsecondary teachers show a
relatively low and insignificant "discrimination
coefficient", data from other sources indicate that there are
substantial salary differentials between the sexes for
postsecondary teachers.
from this group.

2

The most notable result is obtained

Although city size effect on male wages is

positive, it is not significant.

The city size effect on

female wages, however, amounts to 4 percent per million
increase in city size and is significant.

Taken at face

value, the strength of the locational tie associated with
women academics is high and colleges located in small towns
may exploit the situation.

Also, it is interesting to note

that the market for male academics is quite global; the
salaries of male faculty do not exhibit a significant
fluctuation across the range of city sizes.
Academic salaries, perhaps except for teachers who are
just starting, are often determined on an individual-byindividual basis rather than by structured pay schedules.

A

married woman faculty member with a strong local tie in a
small town is not likely to be a hard bargainer in a pay
negotiation.

For there may be no other college in the area

which would hire anyone in her discipline.
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The way academic

salaries are determined may allow enough room for the college
to discriminate against married women faculty members in
setting their salary level.
The results from the data for natural scientists, computer
equipment operators, and social scientists are remarkably
similar.

All three occupations demonstrate negative but

negligible insignificant city size coeffcients for males, and
positive, substantial ones with higher t-values for females.
Since these occupations require fairly high levels of skill
and specialization <which rule out overqualification>, we can
argue that these results more or less conform to the
predictions of discriminating monopsony model for mixed
occupations.

7.2.2

Public School Teachers: A Case of Non-Discriminating
Monopsony

The data for public school teachers indicate no
significant sex differentials in wages.

In fact, public

school teachers are the only group that meets the standard of
a non-discriminating occuaption <with high skill

level> and

that has a large enough number of observations.
However, between male and female teachers, the difference
in the effects of city size on wages is quite substantial.
As shown in Table 7.3, female teachers will gain only a 1.2
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percent increase in wages for each increment of one million
in city size.

But male teachers will gain a 4.7 percent

increase in wages for the same increment in city size.

The

large size of the male coefficient may be attributable to
unobserved factors that are positively related to city size.

3

The direct way to test the non-discriminating monopsonist
model is to see whether the impact on wages of the proportion
of females in an occupation is affected by city size.

As

discussed in Chapter 3, the proportion of females in an
occupation is directly related with the probability of nondiscriminating monopsony.

Thus one can predict that the

higher the proportion of females in an occupation, the more
positively sensitive the wages in the occupation to city
size.

Unfortunately, we cannot test this implication

directly, since there are not enough mixed occupations that
have the same wage levels for both men and women.
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TABLE 7.2
MONOPSONY TESTS FOR SEGREGATED OCCUPATIONS
DIFFERENTIAL CITY SIZE EFFECTS:
SELECTED OCCUPATIONS

N

Mean
Wage

Mean
EDUC

SMSA
Coefficients

Nurse

970

8.14

14.9

.054 (1.8)

Physicians*

312

20.66

19.8

-.007 (-.4)

Police &
Detectives

393

9.34

13.4

• 031

Firefighting &
Prevention

161

7.67

12.6

• 037 (3.

1217

12. 19

15.6

.011

Occupations
Female

Engineers

Dependent Variable: Hourly wage
Control variables: EDUC, EXP, EXP 2

*

Include self-employed.
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,

(3. 9)

1)

(2.2)

MS, FERT (for nurses)

TABLE 7.3
MONOPSONY TESTS FOR MIXED OCCUPATIONS
SEX-DIFFERENTIALS OF CITY SIZE EFFECTS ON WAGES:
SELECTED OCCUPATIONS
Mean
Wage

'/.

Occupation

Female

N

Postsecondary
Teachers

37

461

Natural
Scientists

26

SEX

SHSA

Discriminating

Computer
Equipment
Operators
Social
Scientists

57

33

11.54

234

10.86

7.28

279

11. 1

166

-.153
(-. 1 )

.014

. 040

(. 96)

(I. 8)

-.284

- . 006

.0 37

(-I. 9)

(-. 3)

(I. 2)

-.435 - . 006
( -3. 8) (- . 4)

(I. 0)

-. 156
i-. 8)

-.005
(-. 2)

( 1 . 3)

- . 009

.047

(-. 1)

( 4.

-.035
(-2.8)

.0 21

. 041

Non-Discriminating
Public School
Teachers

72

11. 46

1622

T-statistics in parenthesis
Dependent Variable: Hourly wage
Control Variables: EDUC, EXP, EXP 2

1

MS, NS*SEX, FERT
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4)

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. Since there were too few members of the minority 5ex in
the data for segregated occupations to use as a sample 9 the
members of the minority sex were deleted from the sample.
2.
According to the National Science Foundation Register 9
although the starting salaries of men and women with Ph.Ds
are nearly equal 9 the salary differential increases with
years of experience in all disciplines.
For further analysis
of sex differentials in the academic job market 9 see Johnson
and Stafford [1975].
3.
Also 9 it is widely known that moonlighting and summer
employment are quite prevalent among teachers.
The census
data does not identify the income from moonlighting and
seasonal employment separately.
Therefore 9 if the following
conditions are met 9 we should suspect that the estimate is
biasd: <1> wages from the moonlighting and the summer
employment are higher than from teaching 9 <2> male teachers
practice moonlighting and summer employment more heavily 9 (3)
moonlighting and summer employment opportunities for teachers
increase with city size.
If all three conditions are met 9
then the city size effect for male teachers must be overestimated.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

The empirical findings from the 1980 Census 1/1000 sample
indicate that the wage gap between married men and women
The computation based on

decreases with city size.

regression results shows that about 12 percent of the
unexplained wage gap between married men and women may be
accounted for by city size.

However, the wage-gap between

single men and women does not seem to have a significant
relationship with city size.

These results are consistent

with the main implications derived from the hypothesis of a
locational tie associated with married women.

To the extent

that wives have less market human capital than their
husbands, married women may be forced to optimize their
employment mainly in the local labor market, unlike their
husbands who are more likely to optimize their employment in
the national

labor market.

Given such circumstances, married

women ' s wages will be more sensitive to city size than those
of men or single women.

For as locationally tied

individuals, they are likely to suffer more--in terms of
lower wages--in a small city than in a large city.
This study presented two hypotheses of how the locational
tie operates through specific market mechasnisms to suppress
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the wages of affected individuals in a small city:
overqualification and

(2) employer monopsony.

<1>

Since the

empirical results did not render full support to the
overqualification theory, employer monopsony, as one
alternative hypothesis, was more closely examined.
If our interpretation of the empirical findings is
correct, then two predictions can be made:
(1) The wage gap between men and women arising from the
relative geographic immobility of married women may be
slightly reduced if urbanization trends continue, since women
will increasingly find themselves located in more competitive
local labor markets.
(2) The wage gap caused by the differential mobility of
married men and women is also likely to be reduced as the job
investment behavior of women increasingly assimilates to that
of men <perhaps accompanied by a continuing decrease in the
fertily rate>.

For the increased investment of women in

their market human capital would lower the probability of
their being tied.
The present study also reveals the relevance of the
monopsony model to labor market studies for married women.
Employer monopsony, often regarded as a short-run condition,
has generally received little attention, perhaps because
labor is generally assumed to be mobile in the long-run.
However, as a result of the family utility-maximization
process, married women are likely to remain relatively
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immobile even in the long-run.

Thus for married women,

employer monopsony may not be a transient phenomenon which
can be eventually corrected over time.

This may be the

reason behind the evidence of monopsony found earlier from
the data of registered nurses and public school teachers,
both occupations being predominantly female.
If such monopsony exclusively affects the wages of married
women in a small labor market, then the usual estimation of
sex-discrimination coefficients, unadjusted for this factor,
will tend to overestimate the actual extent of sex
discrimination.
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